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Chapter 10 Opportunities and challenges for the future 
Robin Bryant, Ed Day and Ian Kennedy 
Introduction 
In this chapter we look at some of the opportunities and challenges for the policing of digital crime in 
the future.  This includes developments in digital criminal investigation, (digital forensics and anti-
forensics) and some of the problems with the use of expert witnesses in court. The challenges and 
opportunities often reside in the same phenomenon, for example cloud computing offers the 
opportunity for distributed approaches to dealing with large amounts of data from mobile phones (see 
below) but also provides challenges in terms of the recovery of evidence. 
Developments in digital forensic investigation  
In this section we discuss some of the recent developments in digital forensic investigation, with 
reference to both the opportunities offered and the challenges presented. Garfinkel (2010, p. 64) 
argues that we are now reaching the end of the ‘Golden Age of Digital Forensics’ as we encounter 
volumes and types of data that defy analysis with existing tools. It is certainly true that the processing 
of digital data using automated tools such as FTK or EnCase is a lengthy process. It can take hours or 
sometimes days to pre-process the various pieces of digital evidence for a single case, and this must 
be done  before analysts even consider what aspects require further examination (Cantrell et al, 2012). 
The explosion in the sheer quantity of digital data and vastly increased device storage capacities have 
put increased pressure on digital investigators. However there are various ways the workload of 
digital forensics labs can be mitigated: outsourcing, triage, workload management and automation 
(Jones & Valli, 2008).  
	
	
 The rise in the amount of information to be processed in a digital investigation requires a concomitant 
increase in processing power, which can potentially be achieved either via faster or multiple 
computers, or a combination of the two. The use of multiple machines working on different aspects of 
a task at the same time is known as ‘parallel processing’, and this is often performed by using 
distributed resources that are situated and maintained remotely (distributed computing, using a 
‘Grid’).  
There has long been a call for distributing forensic digital processing (Richard & Roussev, 2004), but 
so called ‘first generation’ forensic tools such as EnCase and Forensic ToolKit were limited in terms 
of  both automation of tasks and their ability to exploit parallel or distributed processing (Ayers, 
2009). A ‘second generation’ of organisations and individuals began using such tools with increased 
computing power.  For example AccessData in partnership with Dell claim to provide enhanced 
processing speeds through the use of a ‘data centre’ with ‘high performance servers’ to run FTK 
processing (Dell, 2009). Multiple core machines such as a Beowulf cluster (50-100 cores), and a 
supercomputer (4096 cores) have been used to reduce processing times (Ayers, 2009), but  the 
disadvantage of such approaches is the need for expensive hardware.   
Grid computing however provides an alternative means of providing the necessary increase in 
processing power.  It reduces the need for new hardware by utilizing existing resources such as spare 
desktop capacity, and  provides a far more powerful (parallel) computing resource than would 
normally be available to an individual investigator. In essence this type of computing links a number 
of resources together in a ‘grid’ and enables a user to run a program using vast but distributed 
resources that are remotely situated and maintained. Grids allow a number of nodes to process the 
data in parallel with potentially substantial time benefits (Voss, Vander Meer & Fergusson, 2009). For 
example the FBI uses an internal grid computing network, the ‘Grid Computing Initiative’ which 
utilizes unused capacity from their users’ PCs (FBI, 2010). One of the contributors to this book is 
currently involved in a research project to determine the viability of grid computing for mobile phone 
forensic investigation utilising the National e-Infrastructure Service (formerly the National Grid 
Service).  The National e-Infrastructure Service (NES) is a computing grid which has already been 
	
	
successfully used for a number of research applications where massive computing power is needed, 
for example to model criminal behaviour of individuals within a city (Malleson et al, 2009).  
Increasing the number of processors or machines to complete an investigative task reduces the time 
spent on each task but can be expensive, and is best used in conjunction with triaging. Digital 
investigation triaging is a heuristic (experience based) method which identifies a hierarchy of 
importance of digital tasks.    Some work has been done on formalizing this process, for example 
Rogers et al, (2006), but they say very little about triaging other than reiterating it requires 
prioritization of tasks. Nor does the model identify how best to triage between cases, an important 
task for efficient caseload management for digital forensic labs. Instead focus is given to triaging 
within a case, for example on deciding whether the analysis of chat logs is worth the time and 
monetary expense for that case. ADF Solutions have recently developed software that claims to triage 
between cases (ADF, 2010). 
Many aspects of the digital forensic investigation of PCs can also be automated using commercial 
tools such as X-ways’ WinHex, Guidance Software’s Encase, and AccessData’s FTK.  There are also 
free and open source tools which perform a similar function, although more of these are available for 
Linux than for Windows.  Ideally such tools should be forensically sound – the Computer Forensic 
Tool Testing (CFTT) project at the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) tests forensic tools using a standardised methodology. The UK lags far behind in tool 
evaluation (Sommer, 2010) and it remains to be seen how the anticipated granting of regulatory 
powers for the Forensic Science Regulator will affect this situation, if at all (Adetunji, 2011).  
 
Solid-state Drives (SSDs) 
Currently most PCs use a hard disk drive (HDD) for storage of data and in forensic terms HDDs are 
reasonably well-understood and documented. Increasingly PCs are being fitted with alternative solid-
state drives (SSDs) instead of, or in addition to HDDs. The SSDs have a number of advantages over 
HDDs: they are smaller, quicker (increased ‘latency’), quieter, more energy efficient and more robust 
	
	
(able to withstand sudden shocks). They are however more expensive, but as with much digital 
technology the price is steadily falling. From the outset netbooks were often fitted with SSDs. By 
default most tablets are now fitted with SSDs; for example the new Microsoft Surface Pro tablet 
contains a 64GB or 128GB SSD according to customer choice. 
However, the increasing use of SSDs has significant implications for digital forensic investigation. 
Digital information is represented as binary digits as an aid to human understanding and manipulation, 
but the real data has to be stored in some physical manner. For example RAM consists of memory 
cells filled with capacitive charge, optical media such as CDs and DVDs contain lands and pits on a 
reflective surface, and magnetic hard drive storage involves small magnets oriented north or south 
(Bell & Boddington, 2010). The conceptual basis of the magnetic storage system used in HDDs has 
changed little since the 1950s (Hughes, 2002) and a drive’s controller chip acts predictably: any 
processes it carries out do not generally interfere with the forensic investigation. The investigation of 
HDDs follows a well-established set of procedures that enable law enforcement to, amongst other 
things, extract data that a user had deleted. This is reasonably straightforward because HDDs merely 
mark deleted files as deleted, but the file content remains on the drive until the space is needed for 
new data (see  the section on the forensic analysis of PCs in Chapter 8 for more detail).  
Modern SSDs store data using Flash NAND memory chips which retain data on power-off (in 
contrast to RAM which requires an electric current to retain data).  At the physical level the NAND 
within the SSDs consists of transistors (technically, ‘floating gate MOSFETs’, see OCZ, 2013) that 
are in one of two electronic conditions (even when power is removed) which in effect represent the 
binary states of 0 or 1 (we have simplified the description). At the logical level SSDs can be thought 
of as being divided into blocks, a typical block being about 512KB. Each block is divided into pages 
of about 4KB in size, it follows that each block contains approximately 128 pages. As data is written 
to the drive, it occupies a page. While each page can be read and written to, it is only possible to 
delete an entire block. Also, pages cannot be overwritten; they must be empty first to write data to 
them. 
	
	
An SSD (unlike a USB pen drive, which also uses Flash NAND and is not considered here) has a 
controller chip that performs more complex processes than an HDD controller (Chen et al., 2009). 
The SSD controller runs an application known as the Flash Translation Layer (FTL) which acts as an 
intermediary between the operating system (OS) and the actual data storage within the blocks. To 
write data, an OS sends a request to the FTL via a standard hard drive interface (such as SATA) and 
the FTL translates this logical request  and maps it to actual data on the SSD NAND chips (Bell & 
Boddington, 2010).  The number of such writes to SSDs chips is limited, with chips failing after as 
few as 10,000 writes (Olson & Langlois, 2008).  With modern SSDs, in order to avoid failure a 
process known as wear levelling is performed by the FTL (older SSDs behave somewhat differently 
and are not covered here).  This involves directing writes to storage areas that have been written to 
less (rather than to where the OS requests), thus levelling out the number of writes per storage area. 
The FTL ‘tells’ the OS that it wrote to the correct place logically even though it may have physically 
written to a very different area from that stated by the original logical address (Bell & Boddington, 
2010).  If an OS deletes a file then tries to write new data to the logical location of the deleted file the 
SSD cannot overwrite the deleted file since it must erase data before re-writing.  (Unlike HDDs, SSDs 
cannot overwrite existing data:  they must first erase old data before writing new data to the same 
location). Therefore the FTL also performs a process known as ‘Garbage Collection’ which moves 
used data pages to other data blocks in preparation for future writes to that block. Garbage Collection 
occurs independently of the operating system – it is a feature of the internal firmware SSD – and 
occurs when the SSD is powered on but not otherwise busy reading or writing data.   
An ATA command ‘TRIM’ was introduced (first available in Windows 7), that allows OSs to tell the 
SSD that the file is deleted thus reducing the amount of data moving required by the SSD (King & 
Vidas, 2011).  Unfortunately (for the digital forensic investigator) when TRIM is enabled with an 
SSD and Garbage Collection occurs, the file becomes effectively irrecoverable (unlike with HDDs 
where deleted files are usually recoverable). This process of permanent deletion is sometimes known 
as ‘SSD self-corrosion’ (Bell & Boddington, 2010) or ‘SSD self-contamination’. This has significant 
forensic implications as it means that as soon after the SSD is powered on there is the possibility that 
	
	
permanent data deletion will occur and the certainty that original data will be altered before an exact 
image can be made (and even if a write-blocker is used; Sheward, 2012). This would be a serious 
breach of most current digital forensic guidelines (for example, ACPO, 2012).  Indeed Bednar and 
Katos (2012, p. 6), are clear that the information and advice contained in the 2010 ACPO guidelines 
‘cannot be used for [the] handling of SSD devices’. The 2012 ACPO guidelines do not appear to deal 
explicitly with SSDs (although NAND memory chips are discussed in the NPIA mobile phone 
Standard Operating Procedures). The only known way to avoid SSD self-contamination is by 
removing the controller, detaching the memory chips from the SSD and by using specialist hardware 
to access and read the data content (Gubanov & Afonin, 2012) – a time-consuming  process and one 
not guaranteed to succeed.  
Further, as well as the garbage collection, wear-levelling and TRIM problems, the way an FTL 
behaves is also not necessarily consistent between devices, and its algorithms are protected 
proprietary data. Thus investigators are faced with FTLs that could work in a number of different 
ways (Bell & Boddington, 2010) which also makes the analysis of SSDs much more difficult for 
forensic investigators. However the outlook is not entirely bleak since magnetic drives are likely to 
still be encountered for many years and there are also hybrid drives: part SSD and part magnetic drive 
which may yet provide other forensic opportunities.  
Developments in cloud computing 
In 2012 the university sector employer of four contributors to this book (in Canterbury in south East 
England) decided to replace their previous email, calendar and contacts software with the new 
Microsoft Office 365. Now, instead of the webmail and other services being physically provided by 
the university they are instead provided through the ‘Microsoft Online Portal’, a data server based 
somewhere in the European Union, probably several hundred miles away.  The services are in ‘the 
Cloud’.  Many other organisations, particularly small and medium sized businesses, are also migrating 
to cloud computing due to the obvious economic benefits and flexibility this provides compared with 
traditional in-house IT infrastructure and services.  Individuals too are increasingly using cloud 
	
	
computing, in many cases with no great knowledge of doing so (or the need to know). For example a 
user of an ipad with  ios6 has the option of turning on ‘iCloud’; ‘Gmail’ is a popular cloud-based form 
of email; Google Apps is a convenient way of cloud-sharing documents with others; many users of 
android-based smartphones would have installed ‘Dropbox’ for online storage; and Microsoft offer 
free online cloud storage with their ‘SkyDrive’ service. These services have developed in part because 
of the greater availability and speed of broadband services and the advent of Web 2.0. 
Traditionally a user’s own machine (for example, the PC on their desk) would store data and run 
software applications, or alternatively a machine or server centrally located within the same 
organisation would be used.  But now the data and services can be located elsewhere and accessed 
through the internet, and through a variety of devices (PC, tablet, smartphone). The metaphor is a 
‘Cloud’ floating somewhere above the user, somewhat ephemeral and delocalised, and not within the 
control of those on the ground. However, Vaquero et al. and others have proposed a more formal 
definition of a cloud computing service (a CCS) as: “[…] a large pool of easily usable and accessible 
virtualized resources (such as hardware, development platforms and/or services)’.  An even more 
detailed definition is offered by Grance and Mell (2009): ‘Cloud computing is a model for enabling 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., 
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released 
with minimal management effort or service provider interaction’. There is a general distinction 
between a ‘public’ cloud computing (the internet used for data transfer)   and ‘private’ cloud 
computing (where an organisation’s intranet is employed). Sometimes however the two are linked, 
with private clouds off-loading some tasks and data to a public cloud. Within the field of digital crime 
policing, attention is currently more directed at public cloud computing services as these provide a 
greater challenge to law enforcement.  
Svantesson and Clarke, (2010) outline five characteristics of a CCS:  
• the CCS is delivered over a telecommunications network;   
• users of the CCS rely on it for  access to and/or processing of data;  
	
	
• the data is under the legal control of the user of the CCS;  
• the CCS is ‘virtualised’, so the user is unaware of which server is running or which host is 
delivering the service, or where the host is located; and  
• the CCS is delivered through a  relatively flexible contractual arrangement in terms of the 
volume of data the CCS stores for a client.  
A CCS can operate in three main ways, and supply different types of services as shown in the table,  
although it should be noted that these can be combined with a single provider (Taylor et al. 2010, p. 
304).  
CCS Description Example 
 
Platform as a Service (PaaS) CCS provides the operating system, 
applications, data storage etc. for the end user 
through the internet 
Oracle Cloud 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
Software as a Service (SaaS) 
 
Software applications are run on CCS 
provider’s system, accessed by the end user 
through the internet 
Google Apps 
 
Security of data is an issue for all providers of cloud computing services, and by implication, for their 
clients. As noted elsewhere in this book, personal data is a valuable commodity and is likely to be a 
subject of interest for many people intent on its criminal exploitation.  The attempted malicious 
hacking of cloud services is almost certainly a regular occurrence. Some CCSs are also hosted in 
countries where privacy laws are inadequate, and security is perhaps less of a priority. There is also 
some indication that the Cloud is being utilised by those with criminal intentions, for example 
allegations include individuals using cloud computing services to ‘run command and control services 
for botnets, to launch spam campaigns and to host phishing websites’ (Wolpe, 2010 citing Rik 
	
	
Ferguson, Trend Micro).  For investigators, indications of the use of CSSs can often be found on a 
digital device, for example, Dropbox leaves traces in the Windows system (McClain, 2011).  
There are a number of forensic opportunities for the investigator in cases where it seems likely that 
potential evidence is located in the Cloud. For example a CCS could be automatically recording 
storage usage, number of log-ins, data displayed and accessed, and perhaps most importantly the IP 
address of a user together with date and time of access, with some of this information being retained 
for significant periods (Taylor et al. 2010,p. 305). However, it is probably correct to argue that in 
terms the forensic capture and analysis of digital data, the current investigator mind-set is still ‘off-
line’, and the guidelines provided in many good practice manuals for example seem to implicitly 
assume that the investigator has control of the storage medium. Part of the problem is that evidence ‘is 
more ethereal and dynamic in the cloud environment with non-or semi-permanent data’ (Taylor et al, 
2010, p. 304). Some of the information which is normally written to the operating system (e.g. date 
stamps) will instead be written to the cloud with the attendant difficulties in recovery. The legal basis 
for the seizure of equipment is also somewhat more uncertain (Mason and George, 2011). Data is also 
moved around in the Cloud from server to server and this might pose difficulties in terms of a digital 
investigator tracking the data down, and there will then be the added problem of gaining the legal 
authority to require the Cloud supplier to provide the data. Finally, there are likely to be increased 
difficulties with the audit trail the Cloud is likely to provide ( continuity logs in particular) when 
compared with, say, hard drive forensics. 
However, cloud computing provides a number of opportunities for the policing of digital crime. For 
example, a distributed cluster of PCs on the cloud can provide the power to break a password used for 
encryption. Cloud computing also provides new forensic opportunities because even if the data is 
securely erased at one location there might still be a copy at another. The Cloud also provides the 
facility to enable an organisation to back up and utilise data whilst digital evidence is being collected 
in situ. 
Policing the Deep Web 
	
	
Most users interface with the internet through search engines such as Google.  To ‘find something’ on 
the web a person will simply type a description into the conveniently provided Google search box 
which will generally produce an impressive number of ‘hits’.  The user will then explore the so-called 
‘visible’ web, often jumping from one website to the next. Occasionally a bookmark will be used to 
access a website or the website address will be typed in for direct navigation to the site. Many people 
will also be familiar with other visible parts of the internet, for example portals to SNSs such as 
Facebook or Hyves, or through apps such as Apple ‘Maps’.  However, beneath this readily accessible 
surface there is a less visible region of the internet that is more difficult to access; the ‘deep 
web’(sometimes known as the ‘hidden web’ or ‘invisible web’).  Most users will be aware that access 
to some parts of the internet is controlled in some way, through gatekeeping such as the use of 
usernames and passwords, and that they may have to manually enter the web address of the site to 
accessing resources. These include web-based email services to special interest forums, commercial 
services (such as the ‘Sky Go’ portal for subscribers to view subscription satellite broadcasts online), 
and databases of academic journals available to students and others.   
The deep web is undoubtedly very much larger (in terms of volume of data) than the visible web. In 
2001 Michael Bergman (widely acknowledged as the originator of the term deep web and citing a 
‘Bright Planet’ survey (Bergman, 2001)) estimated that deep web contained some 7,500 terabytes of 
information and 550 billion individual documents, compared to nineteen terabytes of information and 
one billion documents in the visible web. Most of the deep web consists of entirely legitimate content 
and is not connected with criminal activity. It is also utilised by people, such as political dissidents 
within repressive regimes, who need to keep their identities secret for  reasons of personal safety: 
indeed this was one of the original intentions when the ‘Freenet’ part of deep web was first developed.   
However, the deep web is inevitably also used for criminal activities and these ‘sub nets’ are 
sometimes collectively known as the ‘dark web’ or the ‘dark net’. Examples of dark web activities 
include invite-only and password-protected chatrooms and forums used by cybercriminals for sharing 
information or trading. Some attempt will generally have been made to conceal their existence, for 
example by using obscure naming systems, and casual users of the internet will not generally access 
	
	
the criminally oriented parts of deep web or indeed even be aware of its existence.  Deeper still are the 
parts of the deep web which can only be accessed using specialist software such as ‘I2P’ or ‘Tor’ (the 
latter also is available as a plugin for some internet web browsers).  The open source software 
available to access the deep web varies, but most of it can supposedly conceal the identity (IP address) 
of a user, for example by using random pathways to communicate between parts of the network, and 
encryption.  (The anonymity provided by Tor is sometimes employed as a tool by investigators to hide 
their surveillance of suspects.)  
Furthermore, a suspect using the dark web site ‘The Armoury’ for example (which purports to 
specialise in the supply of firearms and other weapons) might not only employ the inbuilt anonymity 
provided by Tor and similar software, but also conduct business through ‘stealth listings’ of weapons 
which are not visible unless the specific URL is known. The transaction is also conducted using a 
number of ‘tumbler boxes’ which further complicate attempts to trace and demonstrate payment. 
As with the visible surface web, internet services such as forums, data warehouses and wikis are all 
available within the dark web.  These hidden parts are not simply stored as single items on a particular 
server but instead are distributed through networks. Lurid claims are made for the supposed 
availability of nefarious services and items on the dark web including hyperbole surrounding child 
abuse imagery, the supply of illegal drugs and firearms and even offers to conduct murder (for 
example, see the popular English newspaper, the ‘Daily Mirror’, (2012)). Claims are also sometimes 
made for the terrorist use of the deep web. However, the very nature of deep web (for example the 
need for particular software and the anonymity) might make it less attractive to those seeking to profit 
from crime. For example, organised criminal groups attempting to profit from the supply of child 
sexual abuse imagery need to market their services, and this is much more easily conducted on the 
surface web. Similarly, radical groups attempting to recruit new members from disaffected 
communities are likely to wish to display their message in locations which are most likely to be seen 
by potential recruits.  
	
	
However, although claims of serious criminal activity within the deep web are usually unsubstantiated 
there is clear evidence for the availability of a number of illegal products and services, and there are 
also forums for sharing  information on how to perpetrate certain illegal activities. For example, the 
‘Silk Road’  website claims to offer illegal drugs by mail order. In 2012 it was offering for sale 
prescription anti-depressants and opiates, steroid and illegal street drugs including marijuana, ecstasy, 
heroin and cocaine, together with ‘date rape’ drugs such as GHB.  There are a number of indications 
that the Silk Road illegal offer is ‘for real’ and not an elaborate scam, for example, a man from 
Melbourne was arrested in 2012 for importing narcotics he had allegedly sourced from the Silk Road 
(AFP, 2012).  The Silk Road uses a form of ‘anonymised’ currency called ‘bitcoins’ (often referred to 
as ‘BTCs’). Potential purchasers first exchange traditional forms of money (for example, using a debit 
card and an online trading site such as Mt. Gox) for bitcoins, and these are then used for transactions 
and trading.  In mid-2012 it was estimated that approximately 1.9 million US dollars was being 
generated through the Silk Road site (Christin, 2012, p. 3). The site is currently the subject of 
attention from the LEAs around the world, including the US Drug Enforcement Agency.  The users 
and content of the dark web is therefore of clear and legitimate interest to law enforcement agencies.    
The investigation of both the deep web and the dark web can inevitably pose problems for 
investigators given its closed and particularly in the case of the dark web, its often bogus nature. In 
terms of the ‘legitimate’ parts of deep web,  a number of search tools are being developed including 
some from Google. Although these will not necessarily allow access to password-controlled resources 
they will at least reveal the existence of some of these resources. Proactive investigations of the dark 
web will often employ software such as Tor, and could include investigators posing as a customer for 
an illegal service or establishing a connection with individuals or organisations involved in the 
sharing of illegal imagery.  Reactive investigations in the dark web (for example, attempting to collect 
intelligence against an identified suspect) are perhaps more problematic, but use of the dark web does 
not guarantee anonymity for a suspect, largely because of the naivety of most users of Tor and other 
similar software.  An indication that Tor had been used to access dark web would be an SSL request 
to the user’s ISP to become the first Tor node in the communication pathway, together with the use of 
	
	
encryption.  However, if users employ Tor through a web browser they might still have cookies 
enabled, and may also be running javascript, both of which will assist a digital forensic investigator in 
testing hypotheses in terms of a suspect accessing illegal material. 
Anti-forensics 
The term ‘anti-forensics’ is used to describe a range of methods, techniques and actions that are 
intended to thwart the efficacy of a forensic examination of a digital artefact.  At the outset, it should 
be noted that ‘anti-forensic’ methods are often employed by individuals for what we would regard as 
entirely legitimate and non-criminal reasons – for example, for reasons of privacy, to protect 
themselves against the actions of oppressive regimes or simply on grounds of principle and ideology. 
The use of anti-forensic tool by an individual should not necessarily be seen as a ‘smoking gun’ that 
indicates guilt. That said, organised crime groups in particular are likely to be fully cognisant of the 
advantages of adopting an ‘anti-forensic’ mind-set. 
We can identify five main categories of anti-forensics activities and these are described in the table.  
Note that the categories are not mutually exclusive. 
Category Explanation Example 
Source 
elimination  
Use of methods to attempt to stop any 
evidence accruing, particular at source 
Using an ‘incognito’ window with the Firefox browser. 
Using Trojan commands 
Destruction Attempting to completely erase data. 
 
Using software that employs algorithms to repeatedly 
overwrite data. 
Physically destroying the medium that held the data. 
Obfuscation Covering tracks, changing file attributes 
to confuse time of origination etc. 
Use of ‘log cleaners’ 
Spoofing IP addresses 
The ‘Zeus Botnet Crime-ware toolkit’ 
Hiding Altering data in such a way that it is not 
visible or not ‘readable’ 
Steganography. 
Encrypting files. 
	
	
Hiding data in Windows ‘slack space’ 
Counterfeiting Attempting to present one form of data 
as another innocuous form 
Changing a file extension on an image file (e.g. .gif) to 
another extension that is less ‘suspicious’ (e.g. .xls) 
(Derived in part from Harris (2006) and Rogers (2005)). 
Cryptography, the science of encryption, is an important part of  anti-forensics, and presents particular 
challenges to the investigation of digital crime. It involves changing data  into a form which is 
unreadable (encrypted) and  has been used for thousands of years, often as a means of retaining the 
confidentiality of information, particularly important in times of war. A well-known example was the 
Enigma code used by the German military in World War 2 and its decryption at Bletchley Part in the 
UK by a group of workers that included Alan Turing. Encryption can be used for text and data, not 
just for data representing text, and also includes data conveyed over a communication network such as 
the internet. All data, including images, videos and audio files (if not already in in numerical form) 
can be converted into a digital format.  
Modern forms of encryption use a mathematical set of instructions (an algorithm) and a ‘key’, or set 
of keys. The encrypted data can be converted back to its original intelligible form, using the algorithm 
and a key, but not usually the same key as was originally used to perform the encryption. The lengthy 
and complex processing work of encryption is performed by software, much of which is easily 
available via the internet. Examples include, PGP (‘Pretty Good Privacy’) and its derivatives (such as 
GNU Privacy Guard), and other software such as TrueCrypt and AxCrypt.  A number of popular 
applications, such as the Microsoft Office suite also provide encryption as an option for the user. 
Encryption can be used for a complete hard drive, for individual files, or for network traffic. (Many 
readers will be familiar with the existence of the latter when using secure online payment methods). 
The algorithms used for encryption are derived from theorems that originated in number theory (a 
branch of pure mathematics), and particularly ‘trap door’ mathematics which provides algorithms that 
in practice will only work in one direction. This makes modern forms of encryption very powerful, 
and almost impossible to ‘crack’ if correctly implemented.  
	
	
A commonly used form of encryption uses public and private keys, and in this context a key is a 
number or several numbers.  A ‘public key’ is potentially accessible to anyone and a ‘private key’ is 
kept secret by an individual. A public key is shared with others who may then use it to encrypt 
messages. The encrypted messages can be decrypted by the recipients, each using his or her private 
key. To illustrate both the process, and just how difficult encryption can be to crack we will take a 
simple example (adapted from Bryant and Bryant, 2008, pp. 100-101) in which Brian wants to 
encrypt the message 1234 and send it to Anneka using the RSA method of encryption  (in practice the 
encryption is done automatically using software). She chooses two prime numbers such as 26,863 and 
102,001 (a prime number is any number that is not divisible by any whole number other than one and 
itself). Next she multiplies these two prime numbers together: 26,863 × 102,001 = 2,740,052,863. She 
then reduces each of the chosen prime numbers by exactly one, and multiplies the answers: 26,862 × 
102,000 = 2,739,924,000.  Next she needs to find two other numbers that must have a particular 
mathematical connection with the second result (that is, with 2,739,924,000). These two numbers (a ) 
and (b)  have to be chosen so that: 
(a) shares no common divisor (other than 1) with the number 2,739,924,000; 
(b) shares no common divisor (other than 1) with 2,739,924,000),  but also when multiplied by the 
number (a) and then divided by 2,739,924,000 leaves a remainder of exactly 1. 
Using the mathematical process ‘Euclid’s Extended Algorithm’, Anneka finds two numbers that 
satisfy the criteria, namely (a) = 103, and (b) = 1,143,851,767. 
(To check this, calculate 103 × 1,143,851,767 = 117,816,732,001. Then check that 2,739,924,000 
divides into this (43 times) leaving a remainder of exactly 1).  
The two numbers 103 and 2,740,052,863 are Anneka’s public key. (It would in fact be more 
appropriate to describe this as Anneka’s public lock, but the term ‘public key’ is the one normally 
used). To help the explanation we will designate 103 as the first part of her public key and 
2,740,052,863 as the second part of her public key. She sends both parts of her public key to Brian. 
	
	
The number 1,143,851,767 ( (b)) is Anneka’s private key, and she keeps this to herself. 
Brian now sets about encrypting his plaintext message 1234, to be sent to Anneka. First he raises 1234 
to the power of the first part of Anneka’s public key, 103 (that is 1234103; a very large number), and 
then divides this result by the second part of her public key, (2,740,052,863) and notes the remainder. 
The remainder is the encrypted message. In this case the remainder is 1,063,268,443 and hence the 
encrypted version of 1234 that Brian sends to Anneka is 1,063,268,443. Note that Brian has not used 
any information that has been kept secret – he has only used Anneka’s public key. 
Anneka now takes Brian’s encrypted message and raises it to the power of her private key, 
1,143,851,767, and then divides by the second part of her public key, 2,740,052,863. Without the 
private key this part of the decryption process is impossible to achieve by ‘trial and error’.  The 
remainder in this case is exactly 1234; Anneka has successfully decrypted Brian’s message.   
This form of encryption is certainly difficult to decipher, but there are other advantages; by not using 
a secret key in the transmission process the danger of compromising the security of the message is 
practically eliminated.  Public key systems can also be used to communicate securely with groups of 
people.  All of this has obvious advantages to those who wish to share data securely, and inevitably 
this will include those with criminal intent, such as individuals sharing child abuse imagery.   Over the 
past 20 years or so there have been frequent examples of offenders (including terrorist suspects), 
employing encryption as an anti-forensics method.  For example, in 1995 members of the Aum Shinri 
Kyo sect released Sarin gas on the Tokyo underground, killing 12 people and injuring thousands 
more. Members of the cult had used RSA encryption (see above) on computer files in an attempt to 
hide their plans to deploy weapons of mass destruction.   
The existence of an encrypted artefact will be reasonably clear to the investigator: for example, an 
encrypted word file will appear as a ‘nonsense’ string of letters and symbols when viewed with 
forensic software, and will not contain intelligible text (although the file might contain readable 
information concerning the software used for encryption).  Encryption poses significant problems for 
digital criminal investigations (Reyes et al., 2007), as without the password a robustly encrypted 
	
	
digital artefact is near-impossible to ‘crack’. We provide an overview in Chapter 3 of some methods 
open to the investigator (within the law) to secure passwords. 
It is best to capture information using live forensics when possible, perhaps using covert means (e.g. 
surveillance), using surreptitious installation of key logging software through a back door method, 
physical key loggers, electromagnetic capture of emanations from a suspect’s PC etc (but see the 
discussion in Chapter 4 on the legal considerations in the UK surrounding covert methods 
Expert evidence  
The expert’s opinion, findings and associated methodologies in a range of specialist fields are now 
subject to an increasing level of scrutiny.  This is in part due to recent problems with expert evidence, 
for example high profile miscarriages of justice with flawed expert evidence (Law Commission, 
2011).  The Solicitors Journal (2011) cites the Law Commissioner, Professor David Ormerod as 
saying that judges are ‘in the unsatisfactory position of having no real test to gauge the unreliability of 
expert evidence’.  In the case of R v Clark [1999], Professor Sir Roy Meadows made claims regarding 
infant cot death which had with ‘no statistical basis’ (Royal Statistical Society, 2001). As a 
paediatrician (not a statistician), Meadows was testifying outside of his area of expertise, and this 
occurred in other cases too (R v Cannings [2002] and R v Patel [2003]).  All these convictions were 
quashed on appeal, and the Law Commission subsequently reviewed the admissibility of expert 
evidence for use in criminal trails (Law Commission, 2011). Their report calls for a move to 
incorporate a test of the level of reliability of the opinion of an expert witness to ensure that the 
evidence is based on sound scientific principles, techniques and assumptions. 
Requiring greater levels of scientific rigour  as the basis for expert evidence derived from a forensic 
science presents a number of challenges, not least of which is that the term ‘forensic science’ is itself 
a misnomer.  It is claimed that forensic science lacks the scientific principles that underpin more 
traditional scientific disciplines (Kennedy, 2003).  With little formal research and no research agenda,  
there is a correlation between ‘dubious forensic science and wrongful convictions’ (Cooley, 2004). 
The absence of a body of knowledge, established through accepted scientific methodologies has led to 
	
	
criticism of practitioners, and suggestions that they are rhetorical in their application of substance or 
methodology (Saks & Faigman, 2008).  Saks & Faigman go on to state that scientific principles such 
as rigorous empirical testing, inductive methodologies and reporting of error rates are all absent from 
many of the ‘non-science forensic science’ disciplines. 
Without this scientific pedigree, many of the specialties within forensic science face the risk of being 
labelled as ‘junk science’ in court (Huber, 1993).  Epstein (2009) cites fingerprints, handwriting and 
firearms as three examples of such science, and goes on to suggest that evidence from such sources 
should be excluded from trials. Other examples of problematic forensic science include voice 
identification, footprints, ear-prints, bite marks, tool marks, blood spatter and hair comparison 
(Edmond, Biber, Kemp & Porter, 2009).  Broadly speaking, all of these specialties concern 
themselves with applying individualization to link an artifact to a suspect. Disciplines such as 
computer forensics and malware forensics likewise utilise the automated record-keeping nature of 
computer software and operating systems to apply provenance to identified artefacts. 
It is not uncommon to discover malware in the course of any forensic computer investigation, and 
suspects frequently offer the ‘Trojan Defence’, arguing that the contentious actions were performed as 
a result of some form of malware (or cyber-criminal) having gained control of his or her computer 
(see Chapter 8).  Both civil and criminal forensic practitioners of course have a duty to consider such 
a defence (in the UK this would be under the Civil Procedure Rules (Ministry of Justice, 2010) and 
the Criminal Procedure Rules (Ministry of Justice, 2011)).  Forensic practitioners are reliant on their 
tools, skills and knowledge of malware to detect, identify and study the behaviour of any identified 
malware, and they need to form an opinion on the impact any identified malware has had.  But the 
lack of a scientific footing for malware forensics has a greater impact for the discipline than it does 
for computer forensics.  The availability of both undergraduate and post-graduate qualifications in 
computer forensics provides an opportunity for practitioners to engage with their discipline on an 
academic and scientific footing, but although included as modules on some courses, there are no such  
equivalent academic qualifications specifically dedicated to malware forensics. Malware is designed 
to obfuscate its true intentions and hinder attempts to analyse it, and there is therefore already a level 
	
	
of uncertainty associated with any conclusions drawn from malware analysis, and this  can be used in 
a case to raise ‘reasonable doubt’ about the true nature and intentions of  a particular piece of 
malware. The complexity of the subject matter and the specialist skills required to study it (eg: reverse 
engineering & assembly language) may also make the specialty less accessible to practitioners. 
Lawyers seeking to undermine evidence produced from malware analysis currently have a 
rich choice of methods of attack for  introducing reasonable doubt.  Even one of the most 
fundamental requirements of digital evidence, the ability to verify and hence corroborate the 
findings of the expert, is open to challenge.  An established tenet of science is that hypotheses are 
supported by reproducible experiments (Beckett, 2010) and that hypotheses are tested through 
falsification, or refutability  (Popper, 1968).  Although there are some examples of the use of 
falsifiability in forensic hypothesis testing (see Willassen, 2008, in the case of the investigation of 
digital timestamps) these are few and far between. 
Practitioners intending to present digital evidence must expect to be required to defend their findings, 
and disclose enough detail to enable an opposing expert to verify and possibly provide an alternative 
explanation for an artefact.  ‘Dual-tool validation’ is often promoted as a tenet of a scientific approach 
to forensic computing  and hence good practice (NIST, 2001; SWGDE, 2004) and is explained in 
Chapter 8 – in essence it means using one forensic software tool to check the results achieved by 
another.  But there are problems with this, for example one forensic provider states ‘Dual-tool 
verification can confirm result integrity during analysis’ (Forensic Control, 2011), but this is a bold 
claim, and open to challenge if a third tool or manual inspection of the raw data identify a 
discrepency.  Another provider makes the less radical claim that  the forensic software products 
EnCase and FTK ‘allow for a dual-tool approach for the verification of findings’ (Cy4or, 2009).  
However, as in the previous example, no scientific studies or supporting evidence are cited.  A third 
example is a freelance forensic investigator who states on his website (in relation to tool validation), 
that ‘I don't validate my tools - I validate my results. Generally I do this with dual tool verification’ 
(Drinkwater, 2009).  This statement is contradictory, as a second tool is used to check the results of 
another. 
	
	
Dual-tool ‘verification’ thus falls short of the standard scientific criterion for of verification: that of 
the need of falsification as the test of hypotheses.  Put simply, both software tools could arrive at the 
same wrong conclusion either because both are using the same erroneous method or by coincidence. 
Arriving at the same result is not a scientific ‘proof’ is that the outcome is true.  Although it is 
accepted that there are no documented examples of two tools  making the same error (Beckett & Slay, 
2007), this none-the–less could arise, for example, by the use of the same underlying Windows API 
call, and  in such circumstances both tools are making the same erroneous assumption (Sommer, 
2010). The scientific approach is not to repeatedly look for confirmation of the hypothesis but instead 
to formulate ways in which it can be falsified and test for this.  
Although dual-tool verification cannot scientifically ‘confirm’ a result, it can provide corroboration, if 
only at the level of   probability rather than certainty.  However, the main benefit in applying a dual-
tool approach arises where there is a discrepancy in results (Turner, 2008), thereby highlighting the 
need for closer analysis.  An example of this was during the trial of Casey Anthony who was charged 
with the murder of Caylee Marie Anthony in Orlando, Florida.  During this trial a discrepancy was 
identified between two internet history tools used to produce expert testimony.  As a result of this 
discovery, the developer of one of the tools corroborated the tool’s output by reverting to the 
underlying raw data and interpreting the data manually (Wilson, 2011).  Ideally, an independent party 
unaware of the expected outcome should have undertaken this step. 
The acceptance of a tool or methodology sanctioned by others is common practice in both legal and 
scientific circles.   In judicial processes, legal precedent can be cited from prior cases where particular 
techniques have been admitted into proceedings, but scientific work advances by citing and carefully 
extending a previously established body of knowledge through hypothesis testing.  The difference 
arises in how these precedents are determined and hence accepted. Kritzer (2009) argues scientific 
and legal inquiry differ in how they persuade and hence accept propositions.  He explains that the 
scientific tenet of general acceptance and peer review is advanced through repeated attempts to falsify 
a hypothesis, and that truth in a scientific context is complex and elusive, and can only be approached 
by a process of eliminating falsehoods.  This is very different from the concept of  truth as applied 
	
	
within the legal context, which is revealed through the adversarial process.  In accepting a given truth, 
the legal enquirer values certainty, whilst the scientist values doubt and scepticism, argues Marsico 
(2004).  He goes on to state that if justice is blind, then it will ‘blindly follow evidence presented as 
truth’. The role of judges, he continues, should be limited to evaluating the admissibility of evidence, 
rather than to evaluate the credibility of scientific evidence.   
The Daubert test (or Daubert standard) in the USA, developed in 1993 from the Supreme Court 
decision in the case of Daubert v Merrell Dew Pharmaceuticals, provides a framework to assist the 
judiciary in evaluating scientific evidence and the admissibility of this evidence from expert witnesses 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  As explained in Chapter 4, one of the four considerations of the 
Daubert test is the acceptability (to the relevant scientific community) of the theory or technique used 
to derive the evidence. However, within the field of digital forensics there is no established  ‘scientific 
community’ to draw upon (Marsico, 2004).  Instead justification for the scientific basis of a particular 
digital forensic method or software application is often based upon one of two forms of fallacious 
argument (ad populum and consensus gentium), that a conclusion is true simply on the basis it is 
believed by a large number of people; that is by ‘common consent’.  We can see clear consensus 
gentium arguments in a number of examples in relation to the validity of particular software and 
hardware for informing expert scientific testimony.  For example Guidance Software (2011) state that 
they have evaluated their EnCase software product against the Daubert test.  In addressing the general 
acceptance criteria of this test, they argue that with in excess of 30,000 licensed users their product is 
generally accepted.  However, Carrier (2002) points out that a forensic tool will probably be chosen 
on the basis of interface and support, and that the size of the user community is not a valid measure of 
procedural acceptance. 
Van Buskirk & Liu (2006) have observed that statements such as those by Guidance Software lead to 
a tendency within the judicial system to presume that forensic software is reliable.  They identify 
EnCase reliability issues, but Limongelli (2008) of Guidance Software defends its reliability, citing 
Williford v State [Texas, 2004] in which the court concluded that EnCase software is reliable.  
However this conclusion was based on the anecdotal testimony of a single police officer.  Limongelli  
	
	
however goes on to cite Sanders v State [Texas, 2006] in which it was concluded that once the 
scientific reliability of a specific methodology is determined, ‘other courts may take judicial notice’ of 
the result.  No consideration is given to the possible effects new versions of the software, or to bugs 
and/or errors that might arise in particular environments. 
Sommer (2010) identifies how (in the UK)  through the application of Part 33.6 of the Criminal 
Procedure Rules, at a pre-trial hearing just two individuals (the opposing experts in a case) can accept 
the validity of digital forensic evidence derived using a novel approach as ‘sufficient’ for the purposes 
of the case under consideration (but without implying a more general acceptance of the technique).  
Beach (2010) suggests that the scientific approach of falsification of hypotheses is not an issue for 
practitioners operating within the legal arena, as the concept of ‘truth’ differs between the science and 
legal profession – the law’s objective is to resolve conflicts rather than to increase knowledge.  Within 
the bounds of a single case, truth is deemed ‘static’ and not open to re-evaluation.  Denning (2005) 
argues this acceptance of untested theories is a wider problem within the computer science 
community as a whole. 
In the UK, partly in response to a number of miscarriages of justice, the Forensic Regulator was 
formed in 2008 with a remit to ‘establish and monitor compliance with quality standards for the 
provision of forensic science services to the police and wider criminal justice system’ (Forensic 
Science Regulator 2009).  The Regulator’s ‘Codes of Practice and Conduct’ (Home Office 2011) are 
aligned to BS EN ISO/IEC 17025:2005 (ISO 2005).  Forensic service providers now therefore face an 
emerging regulatory requirement to demonstrate their working practices meet with minimum 
standards.  In anticipation of this trend, some police forces are beginning to award contracts for 
outsourced work partly on the condition that the provider is ISO 17025 accredited.  Given the 
appointment of a Forensic Regulator and emerging regulatory standards, it can be argued that the 
issues identified currently undermine the trust that can be placed in findings tendered in criminal 
proceedings. The production of electronic evidence therefore requires the use of reliable tools and 
competent operators, both currently areas of active research.   
